It seems like we enjoy clichés each cycle to try and generalize the norm. For example, if “extend and pretend” applies to banks and “amend to the end” applies to CMBS then “unwilling to bend” may be the next catch phrase to describe life companies when it comes to work-outs and maturity extensions.

Why the lack of flexibility? The lack of flexibility on behalf of some life companies could rest with their MEAF.

MEAF – Mortgage Experience Adjustment Factor
The purpose of MEAF is to help calculate the appropriate amount of capital an insurer should hold (think cash reserves) based on the composition of the insurer’s commercial mortgage portfolio (think portfolio performance).

How MEAF may influence a life company at extension time or at loan modification request: I’ve spoken to some my life company contacts about MEAF. They report that when it comes to MEAF their portfolios are measured against their peers (all other life companies) and even one or two defaults can have a negative impact on their standing against their peers resulting in an increase in their reserves. So consider the state of the commercial mortgage market. CMBS and banks are experiencing massive defaults but insurance companies, who as a whole were markedly less aggressive during the credit boom, have experienced far fewer defaults. However, since their mortgage experience (the insurance companies) is measured against their peers alone, a couple of work-outs/defaults can cause them to have to increase their Risk Based Capital significantly.

One insurer tells me they would rather foreclose and sell the asset versus restructuring it and have it negatively affect their MEAF until the loan pays off in a few years. With foreclosure they get rid of the loan, sell the property and the problem is solved. I’ve witnessed this firsthand with a number of borrowers whose loans matured in the past 12 months. One particular life company asked for a cash infusion and personal guaranty. When the borrower was unable to provide the necessary capital infusion the life company requested that a receiver be put in place and began foreclosure proceedings.

In another instance, a borrower had a Class-A multifamily loan maturing. The borrower was unable to secure a new loan to take out the life company and was reluctant to sell in the soft market. The life company sighted MEAF as a motivating factor to foreclose and resell the property versus modifying it and living with a negative mark against their portfolio performance during the duration the loan continued to be on their books. They made it clear that it affects their entire portfolio rating to have a problem loan. Once they rework the loan it hangs over them until it eventually pays off. Understand that a below normal MEAF can lead to increased reserves against an insurance company’s entire mortgage portfolio. Considering this, one can see the reluctance on behalf of the insurers to offer any extensions or modifications without right sizing the loan.

James DuMars

Managing Director

NorthMarq Capital Phoenix Office

(602) 508-2206 Direct

(602) 714-4202 Cell

 jdumars@northmarq.com

www.northmarq.com

I attended the annual lending conference attended primarily by major commercial real estate lenders, mortgage bankers & servicers.  NorthMarq hosts a couple suites and we meet on the half hour with each lender over a four-day period.  We also host a reception and had 250 lender representatives join us.

FINDINGS:

Generally the convention can be summed up as follows:

“Less Negative is the New Positive”

Things are getting better in the capital markets and interest rates are coming down:  Specific capital providers are outlined below:

LIFE COMPANIES

Life Companies  - almost all are back in the market.  Many reported to have allocations exceeding $1 billion for 2010.   Basically, cash is piling up and they have to invest it.  In order to do so they have cut rates from say 7.25% a year ago to generally 6.25% – 6.75% today.  These lower rates also correspond to alternative investments such as yields on corporate bonds.    Look for a few life companies to go down to 5.75% – 6.0% for lower leverage Class A opportunities.  

REO - Life companies each report to have only a handful of nonperforming loans.  However, they do acknowledge that that number is anticipated to increase throughout 2010.  Despite this fact, they see the current market as a good one to be lending in given the recent expansion in cap rates and decline in values below replacement cost.   Some life companies will take action before a trustee sale takes place and sell their nonperforming loan through a debt sales platform or authorize a short sale.  Others will take the property back and hold it, lease it up and eventually plan to sell it.  NorthMarq has recently financed properties that our  life companies foreclosed on and decided to keep.  In one recent example, we placed the financing through our Fannie Mae DUS program.  

 AGENCY LENDERS/FHA/HUD

Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae – Continue to dominate the landscape for fixed rate and floating rate multifamily loans.  For now we don’t see any other competitors stepping up to challenge them. Fixed rates for 10-year terms remain in the 5.50-5.75% range. Depending on the agency’s perspective on any given market leverage remains 65% – 80% loan to purchase price.  The only potential downside facing borrowers that utilize this financing vehicle is the government’s recent announcement to follow through and end their purchase program of mortgage backed securities.  Depending on who you interview, spreads will either increase or stay flat.  Click on the link to read a recent article.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703410004575029610236173870.html <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703410004575029610236173870.html>
FHA/HUD – This platform has been vital to many developers unable to pay off their high leverage construction loans, however, the view on the street is that this financing vehicle is going to tighten up.  A recent memo from the MBA included the following quote “During a meeting today with representatives of more than ten industry trade groups, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Multifamily Housing Carol Galante stated that HUD will be making changes to the multifamily programs based on the need to “target and tighten” the Department’s multifamily activities.”    Look for a possible 1.20X DCR verses 1.17X and carve-outs as well.  Email me if you want the complete announcement and I’ll send it over.

BRIDGE LENDERS

Nonrecourse bridge money is getting cheaper.  Rates are now in the 5.5% range for say a low leverage (60% to purchase price) multifamily deal (not qualifying for agency debt) to as high as 8-9% for a broken condo acquisition.  Again, the theme is lower rates and more capital entering the market.  Where a bridge lender funded five loans in 2009, they may already have six in process thus far in 2010.�

EQUITY/HIGH LEVERAGE DEBT (Life Companies/Opportunity Funds/Hedge Funds)

Some life companies are talking about equity again.  I would describe their perspective as tire kicking at this point.  Looking for IRRs in the 11% range and long term holding periods of say 5+ years.  They want a strong sponsor and in many cases will pick one in each market for each property type they’re looking to invest in.

Hedge Funds – looking for opportunities.  They are seeking IRRs in the 15%+ range for their high leverage debt (80-85% range).  They will structure their equity as a participating mortgage and go up to 85% of the equity in the deal.  For their equity they’re looking to be in the low 20s on rate.  To be considered competitive the hedge funds will chase empty buildings, discounted note purchases and development deals with tenant in tow.�

CMBS – Although not like the good ole days of 10 years interest only – CMBS Lenders announce new platforms and begin issuing terms sheets. 

Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and a few others are now actively seeking to pool loans for securitization.   They have taken the temperature of the investors and believe a market exists to begin securitizing one off mortgages again.  Look for Goldman to assemble a $500 million pool in the near future.  These are not backed by TALF.  These are market deals, 5-10 year terms and rates in the 6.25-6.75% range (depending on term).  Money is piling up at all the funds that were raised to buy distressed debt and make high interest bridge loans.  These groups will likely deploy the capital in the unrated portions of the CMBS pools as these tranches offer very favorable returns and lower risk on properties that are 70% leveraged at today’s cap rates and underwritten with today’s market rents.  Cash management vehicles will likely be a part of each of the loans as will carve-outs.  30-year amortization and either 5 or 10 year terms will be offered.   This is very good news for the real estate community regardless if you are a borrower of CMBS.  It will offer additional liquidity in the marketplace.   Look for the initial loans to be larger, say in the $10+ million range.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the conference was relatively upbeat.  As I walked the halls of the Mandalay Bay Convention Center I saw lots of old people (like me).  Many young faces are gone or didn’t make the trip.  It’s been a tough three years since the initial memo came out from Moody’s in the spring of 2007 announcing scrutiny of CMBS.  However, I am relatively upbeat after this conference.  This downturn began with a capital crisis and will likely begin to heal up as capital begins chasing returns above the very low returns offered by US Treasuries and banks.

James DuMars is managing director in Northmarq Capital’s Phoenix market.

 

For approximately 12 months, conventional wisdom has suggested that the wide bid-ask separation between sellers and investors would soon disappear and transaction activity would significantly increase at a lower pricing point. Continued deterioration of fundamentals as evidenced by a steadily increasing CMBS delinquency rate (now at 2.1%) would seem to support this forecast. But, as if defying gravity, transactional activity remains stagnant with capital ready to invest but not enough sellers willing to sell at price points required by investors.

There seems to be several explanations for this continued paralysis. Existing assets (equity and debt) are generally held by more strongly capitalized owners than during past downturns, enabling these owners to hold assets until the economy starts to recover and capital markets become more liquid. Government infusion of capital has strengthened financial institutions’ balance sheets thereby reducing pressure to sell assets at substantial discounts and making loan extension and restructuring more likely. Delinquent CMBS loans are turned over to special servicers who often hold the subordinated bonds and, to the extent permitted by the documents, would rather restructure or hold assets than sell at prices that would wipe out all but the senior position.

So the bid-ask remains wide and activity remains stagnant. Will this continue until current owners’ perceived values are supported by a recovering economy and more liquid capital markets or will more owners need to market assets at lower prices indicated by some recent trades? Let us know what you think.

The latest national forecasts by PKF Hospitality Research call for unit-level RevPAR declines in excess of 17 percent and a fall-off in profits of more than 30 percent.  In this depressed environment, cost control becomes even more crucial.  While savvy managers tend to keep a close check on their operating expenditures, one expense item that is not typically on management’s radar screen is property taxes.

For the most part, property owners have no control over the movement of the millage/tax rates set by the taxing jurisdiction. However, there are ways for hotel owners, lenders, and asset managers to take a proactive approach and closely review the assessed valuations of the hotels in their portfolios.  Since market values form the basis of property tax payments, it is important to understand hotel values in this period of volatility.

When determining the value of income product properties, it is essential to be aware of net operating income (NOI) expectations, as well as movements in capitalization and discount rates. According to PKF Hospitality Research's Hospitality Investment Survey 2009, the overall capitalization rate in 2009 is expected to be 10.65 percent, 122 basis points higher than that in 2008. The discount rate is estimated to be 15.17 percent in 2009, representing a 204-basis-point increase from the prior year. The spread between the overall capitalization and discount rates in 2009 was 452 basis points, significantly higher than the 370-basis-point spread in 2008. All these investment factors, combined with the anticipated declines in NOI, are suggesting lower hotel values in 2009 compared to 2008.

Based on information from our firm’s Trends® in the Hotel Industry database, we analyzed the change in property tax expense from 2007 to 2008. For a hotel with annual revenue of $10 million, the average loss in profits for the year was $80,000. Assuming a 10.65 percent cap rate, this equates to a $750,000 loss in value.

In a period of declining values, hotel owners should ask themselves, “Why are my tax liabilities rising?” Hotel owners and asset managers should continue to exercise vigilance in reviewing their property assessments. The need for professional involvement is essential to help establish fair and reasonable values.

Posted on behalf of Charlotte Kang, Vice President with PKF Consulting out of Atlanta.

 

Where were you when the music stopped? More hard lessons are being learned every day in our industry about the risk of high leverage short term debt. As tempting as it is in good times to leverage development and acquisition activity with short term lines and other high leverage debt, the price can be very high in a downturn. Commercial real estate and short term exit/finance strategies are not a good match.

NorthMarq Capital’s mortgage servicing portfolio of $37 billion is comprised largely of fixed rate transaction based financing with staggered maturities. Even our shorter term financings that we now service were generally conservatively underwritten. Our overall 30 day delinquency rate is slightly over 1.0%. We cannot overstate how fortunate we feel that our clients largely chose to finance their properties in this manner.

Many commercial real estate owners are in the enviable position of minimized exposure to the current credit/value crunch because they effectively matched long term fixed rate transaction debt at levels that cash flow even in today’s environment. The best operators staggered their maturities so that no more than 10% of their portfolios mature in any one year. Some owners kept their development/acquisition activity in balance with their financial capabilities. What may have seemed at one point as very conservative financial management now appears so prudent.

So why would anyone make that short term bet? The flexibility, pricing and ease of bank financing at the height of the market; the misplaced belief that the lender/banker will always be there to extend the loan at maturity; the confidence that one will see the point to sell or convert to more conservative financial structure before the music stops and values drop? In the rear-view mirror all those concepts look ill-conceived. Some refused to make the bet.

What did those owner/developers see or believe that others missed? Perhaps the simple understanding that values don’t always go up. YES, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT VALUES OF ANY PROPERTY TYPE WILL BE LOWER IN THE FUTURE. Seems fundamental, but some are just now admitting to the concept. Whether we are talking commercial real estate or any other asset, the hard lesson is that values have always been cyclical and always will be. If you can time the market, high leverage can work. If you guess wrong, creditors will occupy your life. Maybe we forgot these basic concepts because the positive run had lasted so long; many were not even around to see the last meaningful downturn from 1989-1991.

It is a luxury to focus on cash flow and not worry about values in this down cycle. Some real estate owners are in that situation but in most cases it’s no accident they had their chair picked out before the music stopped.

 

Over the next several years, hundreds of billions of debt capital will be needed to refinance maturing loans, and when market fundamentals rebound, additional debt will be needed for new acquisition and development projects.

The future role of the agencies, which provided a lion’s share of debt capital for the multifamily market, is somewhat uncertain as the present conservatorship expires at the end of 2009. Smaller regional and community banks have begun to provide some debt but larger banks remain paralyzed. The number of insurance companies providing debt has diminished and the ones quoting are very conservative. But even if non CMBS sources start to approach “normal” volumes, that still falls short of the expected demand.

The securitization of commercial and multifamily mortgages is critical to providing needed liquidity and, after the market for existing CMBS paper strengthens and market fundamentals stabilize, I expect CMBS new origination to occur, hopefully by 2011. But, in my opinion, prior to a CMBS comeback certain underwriting and regulatory changes will be required for the return of bond buyers’ confidence. These changes include:

* Underwriting needs to adjust from the past to reflect the risk of commercial loans. This will require originators to have to “skin in the game” and not be rewarded simply on volume of securities packaged and sold.

* Rating agency models need to be more conservative with more attention made to the underwriting of individual loans rather than the past reliance on diversified pools and subordination levels.

* REMIC laws need to be revised to allow for greater special servicer flexibility on such matters as extensions, restructurings, assumptions, and the post closing collateral adjustments.

* Some exceptions from market-to-market accounting should be considered for investors electing to limit their ability to sell bonds for some time period.

So, what do you think? Will CMBS come back? What changes do you anticipate? Let us know your thoughts.

 

Do you ever feel alone when you read or watch the news? The only one paying income taxes at the prescribed rates? The only one that resisted the urge to buy a bigger house? The only consumer that lives within your financial means? The only business or investment manager with morals and ethics? The only one that is not looking for a government bailout? The only one not getting anything from the bailout?

You are not alone. In fact 80-90% of Americans are with you. 80-90% pay taxes and their home mortgage and hope the government covers the core areas we expect them to cover. Unfortunately, we watch personal and corporate irresponsibility get confused with those that are rightfully worthy of our help. Yes, some people were taken advantage of, some are so unfortunate that health issues or job issues have caused them harm and yes, we need to protect those victims of predatory financial practices. You could even go so far as to say that some companies are long time American success stories and may need a hand to reach those levels that allow them to continue to employ our neighbors and pay taxes; and yes, we should reach out to help all of them, if it is in our collective interest.

However, too often we see the government rushing to the rescue of the undeserving. Whether it’s real estate speculators, bank executives, businesses without a viable model or the family in the bigger house with the fancy cars that lives well over the edge of financial responsibility, why are we there to bail them out or otherwise give them tax advantages? Is it in our collective interest? Are we reinforcing behavior that we find admirable? Where is the logic of “saving” firms that created unsustainable entitlements for themselves? One scary thought is that those responsible to decide where the bailout money goes are the same politicians that have the United States on a similar track as the U.S. auto industry – a model burdened with entitlements and financial mismanagement that ultimately is not sustainable.

Personal responsibility and accountability seem to be pushed aside for the risk-taking executive, the incompetent and the overleveraged consumer who knew or should have known that there was risk associated with their behavior. During the good times those individuals reaped the rewards. Now they stand with hands outstretched looking for compensation as shareholders are wiped out or for debt forgiveness as other Americans continue to make their payments as agreed. I don’t pass judgment on the behavior; risk takers are rewarded when they are right. But why are we bailing them out when they were wrong?

 

Don’t expect government infrastructure jobs to bail out the commercial real estate industry. A recent story on the Inland Empire area of California shows the limitation of a government-created job market. The 9.5% unemployment rate in the area matches Detroit as the worst in the nation. At the same time, Riverside (one of the Inland Empire communities), has almost $1 billion worth of public-works projects underway or planned, from widening roads to building a new jail. The area illustrates both the promise and the limitations of President Obama’s spending proposal to pull the U.S. economy out of a recession through government infrastructure projects. The commercial real estate market will more closely follow unemployment and investment in the sector, not infrastructure spending.

 

 The fundamental economic problem cannot be solved by government employment and contracting. You don’t have to go far for an example. I visited Havana, Cuba a few years ago and as I watched thousands of people out walking and chatting into the early morning hours on a Tuesday night, I asked my uncle who was born and still lives in Havana, “Don’t these people have jobs to go to in the morning?” He responded, “We all have jobs. We all work for the government. Tomorrow we’ll get to work around noon and do the same thing we are doing right now – chat.” The city of Havana looks like something out of a zombie movie with buildings falling apart after decades of neglect and decay and people spending most of the day without any particular purpose other than looking for something to eat. The system is so dysfunctional Cuba actually imports sugar, one of the few natural resources it enjoys and formerly its largest export. Now the Cuban government’s most effective resource is asking others for aid.

 

 

Ultimately the private sector will carry most of the weight to resolve the recession. America needs to make something, invent something; we need to provide a service with value. The government must put more effort into making it compelling to invest, grow and create an environment where businesses are motivated to hire and consumers have the confidence to spend.

Investment and spending will drive us out of this cycle. Uncertainty, fear and lack of confidence along with expanding the national deficit and debt will prolong it.

How can I not write about the economic recovery package? The talk of
Washington, DC, the economic recovery package is being closely followed by many
business leaders.  USGBC has been
actively working to ensure that the economic recovery package moves the U.S.
toward the new green economy and related long-term economic and environmental
benefits. While the possibilities are many and the opportunities for the real
estate market are complex, there are a few key areas that our industry will
want to watch closely.

The Commercial Building Tax Deduction was established by the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 and permits building owners to deduct expenditures on energy-efficiency
improvements to commercial properties. Many real estate groups are actively
seeking the expansion of funding for this program and other tax incentives within
the economic recovery package.

Additionally, USGBC supports robust funding for the Energy Efficiency
and Conservation Block Grant program through the economic recovery package.
This program, which was created as part of the 2007 federal energy law, is set
up to provide billions of dollars for states, localities, and tribes for energy
efficiency and conservation projects. If funded, this program will empower
states and localities to develop and expand energy efficiency-related programs
and investments. Such funds could be leveraged to replicate successful
initiatives currently in place throughout the country, such as those offered by
state energy offices and public utilities.

Inevitably, funding for green building retrofits will come through many
sources and programs, but the directive is clear. In addition to creating
economic activity and providing our economy a much needed jumpstart, these
monies must contribute to a new green economy. It’s also critically important
that such funds be directed to retrofitting and upgrading existing buildings
owned by private companies, allowing the short- and long-term savings generated
by these improvements to strengthen bottom lines and ultimately be reinvested
in additional upgrades and environmental measures.

If you have any comments or ideas, you can reach Marc at

mheisterkamp@usgbc.org

.

We are looking at $18 billion in CMBS maturities for the calendar year of 2009.  A year or two ago, that didn’t sound like a big deal.  Today, the picture has changed.

But hold on.That CMBS number for 2009 is chump change… for 2010 it swells to $65 billion, in 2011 it’s $55 billion, and in 2012, it’s back closer to $70 billion. Don’t forget to add the life company, agency, and bank maturities to those numbers and now you’re talking some real money.

So how are they going to be refinanced?  With the CMBS market effectively moribund, the life companies having severely restricted programs, the agencies having been bailed out and facing restructures and portfolio cut-backs, and banks gasping for life… the answer is the question.

In reality, there is not enough money to handle the upcoming maturities unless there is a rebirth in some form of the CMBS securitization market.  But will it happen?Possibly, but not in time.

The maturing loan market is a tsunami in formation.  The answer will be a lawyer’s dream.  There are going to be discounts, recasts, extensions, renegotiations, and a whole lot of cash out of pocket if owners want to hold onto their properties.  Did I say foreclosures?  Those too!  What faces the industry is an asset manager’s dream… in the near term that is likely to be the growth industry

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