2011 was marked by a global wave of civil unrest. The fact that social media   played such an important  role has prompted many  government  agencies and  businesses to step up their monitoring of  Twitter and other social  networks. These actions confirm the widening power of social media as   an accelerator of social and business change.

Commercial property industry leaders increasingly recognized that social media immediately amplifies negative buzz about their brands and reputations, and can have an impact on positive imaging and sales if used effectively.

Many leaders, like CBRE and GE Capital Real Estate, asked us to start monitoring what’s being said about them and help engage online movers and shakers. As risk/reputation management and investor relations grow in importance, we also expect many other REITs, developers and publicly held real estate service providers to leave nothing to chance in 2012.

In Q4, 2011 our proprietary CREObuzz™ algorithm identified four times more discussions about Brookfield Office Properties than SL Green or Vornado. The most buzz corresponded to the removal of “Occupy Wall Street” protesters from Zuccotti Park, a space controlled by Brookfield.

Stay tuned for our upcoming insights, as well as filtered news mobile apps focused on commercial real estate. 2012 will mark the turning point in how CRE industry leaders take much more deliberate steps to better mitigate reputation risks in social media channels and define themselves rather than leaving others, like “Occupy Wall Street” protesters, to do it.

CREOpoint will be leading the way with powerful social media management dashboards to help you manage in this new and challenging environment.

JC GoldensteinCREOpoint CEO and CREObuzz founder

Best with source CREObuzz NY REITs Dec 2011

 

 

By James DuMars

As the commercial mortgage banking market has been discussing for the last few months, CMBS as a debt vehicle is essential to the functioning of our real estate capital markets. However, it is important to grasp how vastly different CMBS is from a portfolio loan at a life insurance company. When it comes to the choice between the calm life company environment and CMBS, there is just no comparison. For example, during the period when spreads were blowing out, one of my clients locked rate on a 50% LTV for a grocery anchored retail center with a life company.
We simply got on the phone together and locked the rate at 4.80% fixed for 10 years. The life company didn’t pursue the loan so they could sell it. They see the loan as an investment to cover a promised return they owe to a policy holder. The trade-off for the borrower was to put an additional 10-15% cash down to buy the deal and lock in an extremely low rate and simplified execution. In this instance, the customer saw the value and had the means to invest the extra cash and settle for less leverage and a 25-year amortization versus 30. We had other life companies sandwiched between the CMBS loan quotes and the winning life company quote, but they wanted to get paid for offering the additional dollars. For example, their rates were closer to 5.25% – 5.40%.

Manage Your Expectations
If a life company can’t hit the dollars and amortization you need, a CMBS loan may be your best option. However, expect a choppy, uncertain experience and make sure and grasp that the process has changed since 2007. These changes include lender legal fees running at least $25,000, as all the loan documents have been modified “to restore confidence.” Other changes include some CMBS lenders outsourcing the underwriting and borrowers may get a bill for it. A market auditor will show up and verify that your rents are truly at market. If they aren’t, you’re going to get a haircut. Go into the process with your eyes wide open and full candid disclosure.

Finally, if a mortgage broker calls you and starts the conversation that CMBS is back and a great option before they understand your business model, beware! They probably don’t represent any life insurance companies and CMBS is their only way to survive. Think of a CMBS loan application as a nonbinding letter of intent, with the intent of the CMBS loan originator to sell the loan. If for any reason the market changes and the originator doesn’t believe they will be able to sell the loan for a profit, they will modify the loan to make it saleable or they won’t make the loan.

James DuMars is managing director of NorthMarq Capital’s Phoenix office.

The multi-family side of the GSEs has proven over two decades that it can effectively and profitably execute and close billions of dollars of multi-family rental housing loans. Through that activity, it has stabilized apartment values by providing capital to a broad spectrum of rental housing. One third of American households rent. Those properties are owned by pension funds, REITs and tens of thousands of small business and family partnerships of every form, in every community in this country. A critical component of every apartment investment is consistently available fixed-rate mortgages.

 The GSEs have continued to perform profitably the core business of providing long-term fixed-rate mortgage capital to the apartment market, through recessions and the single-family boom and bust.

News Flash Number One: To those that are responsible for deciding the future of the GSEs, it wasn’t the corporate structure that created this excellent, well-operated business line within Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, it was the people who were there every day, operating this business and making underwriting decisions. And not only were they making solid decisions but executing them in a timely manner that resulted in transactions being closed in 60 to 90 days as a normal course of business.

The exceptional people that have managed that business have never received the credit due to them.  Unfortunately, through the inaction and missteps–and in some cases careless negligence–of regulators and politicians, the multi-family businesses of the GSEs are on a path that, if not corrected soon, will lead to their effective demise. Key employees at both Freddie and Fannie continue to resign as they reach the limit of their patience. This talent drain will result in the GSEs’ inability to operate to the high standards they have historically adhered.

Both firms have lost regional managers, credit officers, production managers and most recently the head of Freddie Mac Multi-family, Mike May. It’s not too late to stop this loss of talent. The responsibility falls on regulators and politicians to take action now. Certainty of employment is an absolute necessity. Good people want to know where their company is headed; they want to be associated with success and receive the recognition and compensation that is fairly due to them. Not only have they not received the recognition due to them, they have been broadly painted with the failures of the single-family business.

News Flash Number Two: There is no foolproof structure. It’s all about good people. People that are self-absorbed with their own personal greed and agenda for power and money will game any system for their own benefit. Those people are not interested in the long-term success of the enterprise; they are only interested in themselves. That perspective is unfortunately common in many poorly run businesses. Said another way, it’s always about the people! Good people that have the right values will make any enterprise with a fundamentally sound concept successful.

 Have you ever wondered why Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have less than a 1 percent multi-family rental delinquency rate and the commercial mortgage-backed securities market has a 15.7 percent delinquency rate on the same property type? It’s about people making the right long-term decisions– consistently.

It’s not too late to fix this. There are still enough good people at both firms to operate as successfully as they have in the past, and given the opportunity, they are capable of supplementing their bench talent with the right type of additional new hires. But the talent pool is shrinking fast as GSE employees continue to resign, and both firms are at a major disadvantage in hiring key people.

The time to act is now; doing nothing will effectively result in the demise of these critical businesses. The potential financial impact to rental housing and the economy cannot be understated. The private sector does not have the capacity to replace the $324 billion portfolio of fixed-rate mortgage capital for multi-family rental properties held or sponsored by the GSEs and related agencies. Segregate the GSE multi-family business from single-family and put in place the assurances and guidance necessary for this business to survive before it’s too late.

Eduardo “Ed” Padilla is CEO of NorthMarq Capital.

(For more on the GSEs, click here for Shekar Narasimhan’s views.)

 

Shekar Narasimhan offers his thoughts on how the GSEs benefit the rental housing market, whether privatization is a viable alternative and the risks of not finding a solution quickly. Click on the link for his thoughts. And then weigh in with your own thoughts!

Multifamily First

Richard Green, director of the USC Lusk Center for Real Estate, offers insights into the best alternatives for reforming Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

By: James Dumars

We’ve not seen a recovery in the multi-family rental market but values have increased dramatically.  It’s easy to draw the positive correlation between lower interest rates and falling cap rates for multi-family.  

Multifamily owners have a significant advantage over owners of all other types of commercial real estate as they can access government guaranteed debt from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.  As I understand it, the investors who buy this debt on the secondary market are rewarded with higher yields than standard US Treasuries but receive the government’s guaranty on the bonds.   Consequently, recent Freddie Mac securitizations have reportedly been very successful as fund managers snap up the paper. �

A case in point: A specific property would have traded for a 6.25% cap rate a year ago.  The property recently went under contract at a 5.25% cap rate, which is approximately 20% more than it would have traded for a year earlier, despite the fact that rents have not increased.  The buyer obtained an agency mortgage with a fixed rate of 4.93% based on today’s closing treasury yield plus a spread of 197 basis points.  The buyer competed with 20+ other investors for the deal and was selected from a best and final of the top three.  The buyer, like many others, recognizes that the replacement cost of the Class A asset is $125,000 per door and he would likely have to go to the outskirts of town to build a similar property.  Buying the asset in the $90k per unit range provides him with upside in value and future rents once the oversupply is eventually absorbed.   He also locks in a very attractive interest rate on a fully assumable mortgage that can be increased in the future through supplemental funding.

I’ve seen this market transition from vulture buyers looking for multifamily to buyers who have raised funds and intend to build a presence in Phoenix.  The vultures have gone quiet as the opportunities they were waiting for have not materialized, thanks to the very competitively priced capital available from the agencies.

James DuMars, managing director/senior vice president for NorthMarq Capital’s office in Phoenix, has more than 20 years of experience resolving complex commercial financing issues. Contact James at (602) 508-2206 or jdumars@northmarq.com

By: James DuMars, managing director-NorthMarq Capital’s Phoenix office

We’re seeing increased activity from several large banks and investment banks as they seek to accumulate loans for their CMBS programs as well as increase “on book” commercial real estate loans.

Just this week, I met with one national bank and learned that they funded approximately $1 Billion in new permanent loans in the past 60 days within their Commercial Mortgage Origination group, bringing their total year-to-date production to $1.6 Billion. Their goal this year is $3 Billion, significantly more than the $700 Million they originated in 2009. Many of these loans are slated for CMBS but if need be, the bank will hold these loans. Their plan is to take a portfolio of $500 Million to market sometime later this year. When asked about the supply of “B Piece” buyers, the bank representative replied that they believe the pool will be fully subscribed but if need be, the bank will hold their “B” piece. They’re confident in their underwriting.

Despite the fact that since 2008 no traditional type CMBS pools have been securitized, this trend to accumulate CMBS structured loans and sell them is consistent with business plans of several national banks and investment banks.

Lenders report their survey of the market tells them there’s no shortage of investors. It’s just difficult to find deals that make sense or borrowers willing or able to borrow, which in some instances involves writing a check to pay down an existing over leveraged property. This imbalance of supply and demand is creating inertia for spread compression and slightly more aggressive lending.  Again, this activity surrounds the perception that the typical CMBS pools of the past can again be profitable for firms even though none have yet to be taken to market.

For example, the recent $309 Million Pool RBS/Natixis securitized wasn’t exactly what we would call a traditional CMBS pool. Reportedly, it was multi-borrower, a total of six loans and most of the loans were nearly simultaneously closed with the securitization of the pool. Rumor has it that some of the loan documents had “flex language” meaning if need be the originator could have the borrower agree to changes to the documents to satisfy the bond buyers. Finally, the securitized portion of the pool was all investment grade rated with a private placement of the mezzanine piece.

Today’s loans range from 70-75% loan to value, 225-240 spreads over 5-or-10 year swaps depending on loan term, which equates to an interest rate of 5% and 6% respectively. Amortizations are typically 30 years with the loans sized to 10% debt yields and 1.35 X debt coverage ratios.

Rents are being marked to market or being blended to market depending on tenant credit. Typically a market vacancy is applied when underwriting or a micro-market vacancy if the asset is uniquely competitive.

James DuMars, managing director/senior vice president of NorthMarq Capital’s office in Phoenix, has more than 20 years of experience resolving complex commercial financing issues. Contact James at (602) 508-2206 or jdumars@northmarq.com

This headline is being broadcast throughout the real estate industry and is stirring up optimism that more liquidity is returning to the marketplace.

The new loans are more conservative and have some nuances reflecting the decrease in risk tolerance of both the originators and the purchasers of the paper. The originator doesn’t want to be stuck with the paper and the purchaser wants to make sure the value or rating of the paper stays intact.

To identify the major differences in the new CMBS loans verses those offered during the credit boom, I’ve summarized a brief comparison below:

Present/Former

 Amortization: Required/Interest Only Common

Loan to Value: 65-70%/80%

DCR: 1.30X/1.20X

Debt Yield: 12%/None

Rate: 6.25%/5%-6%

Lock Box: Required/Negotiable

Warm Body: Required/Negotiable

Pool Size:$500MM/$2BB+

Debt Yield – The term debt yield means dividing net cash flow (the cash flow after reserves for tenant improvements, leasing commissions and reserves) by 12% and you arrive at your maximum loan amount.

Lock Box – if the debt coverage ratio drops below 1.10X then the lender collects your rents directly.

Reviewing the contrasts between the terms offered during the former and present periods it’s logical to see the peak versus trough correlation. Logic indicates as securitizations increase and competition arises for the new CMBS paper that gradually the present platform will evolve to look closer to the former. The question that remains is when?

As more players have entered the market, we have seen firms start hiring again as well as a break in pricing. From early 2010 to today we’ve seen CMBS rates drop from 7% to 6.25%. That’s good news for the capital markets and reflects a trend that demand exists for the paper.

If you’re contemplating a CMBS loan, go in with realistic expectations including the “present” terms outlined above, expecting the lender to mark your rents market as well as applying a market vacancy to your project. Additionally, like portfolio lenders, CMBS lenders will be less aggressive in markets that have a greater percentage of defaulting CMBS loans.

James DuMars
Managing Director
NorthMarq Capital Phoenix Office

2929 East Camelback Road, Suite 226
Phoenix, AZ 85016

(602) 508-2206 Direct
(602) 714-4202 Cell
(602) 954-6168 Fax

jdumars@northmarq.com
www.northmarq.com

It seems like we enjoy clichés each cycle to try and generalize the norm. For example, if “extend and pretend” applies to banks and “amend to the end” applies to CMBS then “unwilling to bend” may be the next catch phrase to describe life companies when it comes to work-outs and maturity extensions.

Why the lack of flexibility? The lack of flexibility on behalf of some life companies could rest with their MEAF.

MEAF – Mortgage Experience Adjustment Factor
The purpose of MEAF is to help calculate the appropriate amount of capital an insurer should hold (think cash reserves) based on the composition of the insurer’s commercial mortgage portfolio (think portfolio performance).

How MEAF may influence a life company at extension time or at loan modification request: I’ve spoken to some my life company contacts about MEAF. They report that when it comes to MEAF their portfolios are measured against their peers (all other life companies) and even one or two defaults can have a negative impact on their standing against their peers resulting in an increase in their reserves. So consider the state of the commercial mortgage market. CMBS and banks are experiencing massive defaults but insurance companies, who as a whole were markedly less aggressive during the credit boom, have experienced far fewer defaults. However, since their mortgage experience (the insurance companies) is measured against their peers alone, a couple of work-outs/defaults can cause them to have to increase their Risk Based Capital significantly.

One insurer tells me they would rather foreclose and sell the asset versus restructuring it and have it negatively affect their MEAF until the loan pays off in a few years. With foreclosure they get rid of the loan, sell the property and the problem is solved. I’ve witnessed this firsthand with a number of borrowers whose loans matured in the past 12 months. One particular life company asked for a cash infusion and personal guaranty. When the borrower was unable to provide the necessary capital infusion the life company requested that a receiver be put in place and began foreclosure proceedings.

In another instance, a borrower had a Class-A multifamily loan maturing. The borrower was unable to secure a new loan to take out the life company and was reluctant to sell in the soft market. The life company sighted MEAF as a motivating factor to foreclose and resell the property versus modifying it and living with a negative mark against their portfolio performance during the duration the loan continued to be on their books. They made it clear that it affects their entire portfolio rating to have a problem loan. Once they rework the loan it hangs over them until it eventually pays off. Understand that a below normal MEAF can lead to increased reserves against an insurance company’s entire mortgage portfolio. Considering this, one can see the reluctance on behalf of the insurers to offer any extensions or modifications without right sizing the loan.

James DuMars

Managing Director

NorthMarq Capital Phoenix Office

(602) 508-2206 Direct

(602) 714-4202 Cell

 jdumars@northmarq.com

www.northmarq.com

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